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SEPARATING COMMERCIAL PARROTING
FROM PIRATING:* BOARD OF TRADE
V. DOW JONES & CO.
Imitation as a form of flattery is antithetical to the principles behind a
misappropriation claim.' Few plaintiffs would feel flattered if their property
were wrongfully appropriated to the commercial advantage of a competitor
in the same enterprise.2 The typical plaintiff in a misappropriation case claims
an interest in protecting its property, produced through great labor and
expense, from wrongful appropriation.3 The typical defendant's interest is
in fostering competition through imitation in a free market economy., In
* "In a setting of contemporary practices, there is a critical, albeit fine, line separating
commercial parroting from pirating." CBS v. Melody Recordings, 134 N.J. Super. 368, 378,
341 A.2d 348, 353 (1975).
1. The misappropriation doctrine is a branch of unfair competition. 2 R. CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 15.01 (4th ed. 1982). Traditionally,
three elements were essential to prove an unfair competition claim: the plaintiff and defendant
must have been competitors; the defendant must have appropriated a business asset in which
plaintiff had invested time and money to develop; and the consuming public must have been
deceived as to the source of the goods. Id. In a competitive business setting, the originator
of a product neither welcomes nor enjoys the competition engendered by an imitator. If the
imitator is allowed to ride "piggyback" into the marketplace "on the shoulders of one who
has legitimately sown, the classical injunction against the reaping of another's harvest is violated."
Id. at § 15.07.
2. See International News Serv., Inc. (INS) v. Associated Press (AP), 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
The INS Court held that INS had misappropriated news items gathered and written by AP
when INS published them in certain west coast newspapers before the AP published there.
Id. at 239-41. The INS decision is recognized as the genesis of the misappropriation doctrine
under the unfair competition umbrella. Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 H~ARv.
L. REV. 888, 933 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Competitive Torts]; see Baird, Common Law
Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50
U. Cm. L. REv. 411, 412 (1983); Comment, The Misappropriation Doctrine After the Copyrights
Revision Act of 1976, 81 DICK. L. REV. 469, 476 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Misap-
propriation Doctrine]; infra note 38. Other branches of unfair competition also include monopoly,
interference with business relations, unlawful conduct of a business, and trademark law. For
an exhaustive treatment of these areas, see 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1.
3. Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 VAND. L. REV. 483,
483 (1958). The common law tort of unfair competition encompasses misappropriation, and
protects property, including intellectual property, that is not specifically protected by patents,
copyrights, trademarks, or contracts. Id. The misappropriation doctrine, in turn, furthers the
preservation of free competition within our economy by controlling unfair or commercially
immoral conduct. The Illinois Appellate Court has observed that "[c]ompetition is a desideratum
in our economic system, but it ceases to serve an economic good when it becomes unfair.
The concept of fair play should not be shunted aside on the theory that competition in any
form serves the general good. Only fair competition does that." Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc.,
50 II. App. 2d 402, 412, 200 N.E.2d 615, 620 (1964) (emphasis in original), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 33 II. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966).
4. "Free copying and imitation comprise the general rule, while monopolistic, exclusive
rights conferred by the laws of patent, trademark, and copyright are the exception." Comment,
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evaluating misappropriation claims, courts generally require the plaintiff to
prove both that it has suffered injury in the marketplace' and that the defen-
dant, a direct competitor,6 has been unjustly enriched through the wrongful
appropriation.' The competitive injury requirement, however, has been
relaxed8 as misappropriation has evolved as part of the common law tort
of unfair competition. Recently, misappropriation in Illinois has been
re-shaped to emphasize the underlying concept of fairness through its
application of the misappropriation doctrine to diverse business settings.
When it decided Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co.,9 the Illinois Supreme
Court became one of the few jurisdictions that does not require the party
alleging misappropriation to be a direct competitor of the imitator.'" The
Symposium: Selected Business Torts in Civil and Common Law Systems, 53 TUL. L. REV.
164, 164 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Business Torts]. Because competitive free enter-
prise is important to our economy, courts recognize a strong public policy in favor of pro-
moting fair competition. Id.; see also Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 11l, 122
(1938) ("Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the exer-
cise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is
deeply interested."); 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1, at § 15.01 ("imitation is unlawful only
if accompanied by other unconscionable activity"); Comment, Misappropriation Doctrine, supra
note 2, at 469 (critics contend that misappropriation doctrine runs counter to constitutional
policy favoring free access to ideas).
5. See, e.g., CBS v. Melody Recordings, 134 N.J. Super. 368, 379, 341 A.2d 348, 353-54
(1975) (competitive injury occurred when defendant appropriated plaintiff's product without
incurring any of the associated costs); Mercury Record Prod. v. Economic Consultants, Inc.,
64 Wis. 2d 163, 174, 218 N.W.2d 705, 709 (1974) (successful misappropriation claim requires
"commercial damage" to plaintiff). One prominent commentator in the field of unfair com-
petition believes the INS decision, see supra note 2, places a new emphasis on the competitive
relationship and the "reciprocal rights and duties that are peculiar to it and emanate from
it." 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note I, at § 15.04.
6. Direct competitors are two companies operating in the same sector of the business
community, competing in the sale of the same service or product. The relationship creates a
duty for each party to conduct its own business in a way that does not unnecessarily or unfairly
injure the other party. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
But cf. Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp.
315, 325 (D. Idaho 1961) (companies must have same "primary purpose" in their business
operations to be considered direct competitors for purpose of misappropriation claim).
7. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918)
(INS's appropriation of AP news items produced unfair advantage for INS in competitive news
business because it did not incur expense that AP incurred in collecting and disseminating news);
CBS v. Melody Recordings, 134 N.J. Super. 368, 378, 341 A.2d 348, 353 (1975) (imitator can-
not profit from another's effort by marketing an essentially identical product).
8. See, e.g., CBS v. Melody Recordings, 143 N.J. Super. 368, 375, 341 A.2d 348, 352
(1975) (common law has developed expansive view of unfair competition); Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (1950)
(unfair competition claim does not require direct competitive injury), aff'd per curiam, 279
A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); Comment, Misappropriation Doctrine, supra note 2, at
475; see also infra note 38 (INS decision discarded the "passing off" requirement of an unfair
competition claim).
9. 98 111. 2d 109, 456 N.E.2d 84 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d
Cir.) (television network had misappropriated compilation of Charlie Chaplin film clips in a
show that did not compete with plaintiff's planned show), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60 (1982);
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court refused to allow the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) to use the Dow
Jones stock market index" as the basis for the CBT's recently-created stock
market index futures contract,'" even though the two companies do not com-
pete in the same field. The Dow Jones decision departed from the tradi-
tional misappropriation analysis, espoused by numerous courts, which focused
on the competitive relationship of the parties.' 3 Rather, the court balanced
the competing concepts of protecting those who develop intellectual property
and promoting the free market economy through innovations based on
imitation and duplication."' Ruling in favor of expanded intellectual property
rights, the court concluded that this increased protection would act as a
stimulus to the economy. The flexible balancing approach used by the Dow
Jones court is commendable because it is responsive to a fast-changing
economy. Future decisions are needed, however, to establish guidelines for
the application of Illinois' new approach to misappropriation claims.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Dow JONES
The Chicago Board of Trade, the nation's largest and oldest commodities
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 796, 101 N.Y.S.2d
483, 492 (1950) (unfair competition laws do not rest solely on direct competitive injury), aff'd
per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951). The Metropolitan Opera court held that
an opera company did not have to prove that it competed with a recording company to succeed
in its misappropriation claim. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
11. A stock market index measures changes in the value of a designated selection of stock,
which, in turn, indicates general fluctuations in the market. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
is based on the value of 30 stocks that the publisher regards as representative of the wide
selection of industrial stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. To compute the average
increase or decrease in the stock values, Dow Jones uses a divisor that takes into account
the number of stock splits each of the 30 selected stocks has had. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average "is probably the most familiar of stock price measures and the most widely quoted
by professional investors and taxicab drivers." J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET:
THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 60 (1973). For a discussion of the history of the industrial averages,
see McSherry, Preface to Dow JONES & Co., THE Dow JONES AVERAGES, 1885-1980 at i-iii
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Dow JONES AVERAGES].
12. A futures contract, traded on a commodities exchange, is a contract to pay a specified
price for a certain commodity at a designated future date. "Commodity" no longer merely
means domestic agricultural goods such as wheat, soybeans, and corn; the definition was
broadened by the Commodity Exchange Act in 1974 to include "all services, rights and interest
in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." 7 U.S.C.§ 2 (1982). Under this more expansive definition, commodities futures contracts include trading
in financial instruments such as Government National Mortgage Association certificates and
security indices. 1 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 4.39 (1982). A particular stock
market index is the "commodity" traded; it is based on the value of the index at a designated
future date. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 Il. App. 3d 681, 685, 439 N.E.2d
526, 529 (1982).
13. See, e.g., NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) (no misap-
propriation when parties competed only collaterally); Mercury Record Prod. v. Economic Con-
sultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 174, 218 N.W.2d 705, 709 (1974) (commercial damage to plain-
tiff required).
14. 98 Il. 2d 109, 121, 456 N.E.2d 84, 90 (1983).
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exchange,'" sought preliminary approval in February 1980 from the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)'6 to introduce a stock
market index futures contract on its exchange. " Before seeking the CFTC's
approval, the CBT had spent two years devising its own stock index to use
as the underlying commodity for its new futures contract.'" The index,
however, did not receive CFTC approval.' 9
The CBT had a long-term subscription agreement with Dow Jones"0 to
receive its financial news service, allowing the CBT to compute and display
all the Dow Jones Averages on its trading floor.2 ' In an effort to acquire
an exclusive rights agreement to use the Dow Jones Averages as the basis
15. Id. at 111, 456 N.E.2d at 85.
16. The CFTC is a five-member federal administrative body that regulates activities of all
commodities exchanges in the United States. The source of the Commission's vast regulatory
powers is the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). The Commission's approval
is required for all futures contract trading on each commodity exchange designated as a con-
tract market. For a complete discussion of the history and duties of the CFTC, see I P. JOHNSON,
supra note 12, at §§ 4.25, 4.32; McDonnell & Freund, The CFTC's Large Trader Reporting
System: History and Development, 38 Bus. LAW. 917, 917-18 (1982).
17. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones, 108 111. App. 3d 681, 685, 439 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1982).
Although other commodities futures contracts, such as for corn or wheat, are settled by delivery
of the commodity, futures contracts for stock indices cannot be delivered. These latter con-
tracts are settled four times annually by the exchange of promissory notes for the appropriate
sums. Id. Under this method of settlement, the value of the proposed CBT Index futures con-
tract would have been 50 times the value of the Dow Jones Average on the last day of the
trading period. Id.; Brief for Appellee at 4, Chicago Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co.,
98 II1. 2d 109, 456 N.E.2d 84 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
Experts testified at trial that the "overriding purpose" of trading in stock market index futures
contracts is to manage the risk of a large stock investment portfolio. 98 111. 2d at 112, 456
N.E.2d at 85. Trading in stock index futures contracts controls the risk associated with the
"broad general movements of the stock market as a whole," because the contracts act as a
hedge against a precipitous decline in the stock market. Id. at 113, 456 N.E.2d at 86. Dow
Jones, however, contended that many persons familiar with commodities regard stock index
futures merely as a form of wagering on the ebb and flow of the stock market. Brief for
Appellee, supra, at 6-7.
18. 98 111. 2d at 113, 456 N.E.2d at 86.
19. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 108 I11. App. 3d 681, 685, 439 N.E.2d 526,
529 (1982). After the trading of futures contracts in financial instruments began, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) "mounted a vigorous campaign to wrestle jurisdiction from
the (CFTC] over futures contracts in at least some type of securities." I P. JOHNSON, supra
note 12, at § 4.25. In a jurisdictional accord between the two commissions in December 1981,
it was agreed that the CFTC would regulate trading of this new kind of futures contract, limiting
trading to those stock index futures contracts that are based on widely-known and well-recognized
indices. 98 III. 2d at 113-14, 456 N.E.2d at 86.
20. Dow Jones & Co., headquartered in New York City, publishes the Wall Street Journal,
Barrons, and the Asian Wall Street Journal. The company also compiles stock market indices
to measure trading activity in several categories and publishes the Dow Jones News Service
for distribution to subscribers. The company's indices include the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
Transportation Average, and Utilities Average. 98 Ill. 2d at 111, 456 N.E.2d at 85. For a
history of the company, see Dow JONES AvERAGES, supra note 11, at ii-iii.
21. The contract provided that the CBT would pay a monthly charge in order to display
the Dow Jones News Service on the trading floor. 98 I11. 2d at 122, 456 N.E.2d at 90.
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of its stock index futures contract, the CBT offered to pay Dow Jones ten
cents per transaction. Such an arrangement could have produced between
one and two million dollars in annual licensing fees for Dow Jones." Two
other prominent publishers of stock indices had signed similar licensing
agreements with commodities exchanges. 3 Nonetheless, Dow Jones refused
the CBT's licensing offer.2 '
In February 1982, the CBT made formal application to the CFTC for
approval to introduce the stock index futures contract, based on a "CBT
Index" that was clearly identical to the Dow Jones Industrial Average."
The CBT did not reveal in its initial application that its index was based
on Dow Jones's. It later amended its application, however, to credit Dow
Jones and to include a disclaimer of any association with the financial news
firm. 26
Before the CFTC ruled on the CBT's application, the CBT filed suit in
Cook County Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that its use of
the Dow Jones Averages did not violate Dow Jones's legal or proprietary
rights.2 The circuit court ruled in favor of the CBT and Dow Jones appealed
to Illinois' First Appellate District.28 The appellate court reversed
unanimously, determining that the CBT's use of the Dow Jones index as
a trading vehicle went beyond the terms of the subscription agreement between
the two parties.2 9 Noting that traders in futures contracts would know that
22. Id. at 120, 456 N.E.2d at 89.
23. Standard & Poor's 500 had a licensing agreement with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
and Value Line Index had a similar agreement with the New York Futures Exchange. Standard
& Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
24. Dow Jones contended that a licensing agreement for use of its name and averages for
stock index futures contracts would link it to the "speculative field of futures trading [and]
would damage its image as an advocate of conservatism in investment policy." Board of Trade
v. Dow Jones, 108 II1. App. 3d 681, 685, 439 N.E.2d 526, 529 (1982). Dow Jones had declined
licensing requests from three other commodities exchanges that wanted to base their stock index
futures contracts on its Averages. Brief for Appellee, supra note 17, at 9.
25. 98 I11. 2d at 114, 456 N.E.2d at 86. While the CBT had not made any specific reference
to the Dow Jones Averages in its application, it had cut out a Dow Jones Average listing
from a daily newspaper and pasted in onto its draft proposal to the CFTC. Id.
26. After the CFTC informed the CBT that its proposed index was identical to the one
produced by Dow Jones, the CBT amended its application to show that the two indices were
the same. Id.
27. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., No. 82 L 4067 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty. June 4, 1982).
28. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones, 108 Ill. App. 3d 681, 439 N.E.2d 526 (1982). Mean-
while, Dow Jones had filed suit in the Southern District of New York seeking to prevent the
CBT from using the Dow Jones Averages as the basis of the futures contract. See Dow Jones
& Co. v. Board of Trade, 539 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The district court dismissed
all claims, except the copyright infringement count, which it said should be decided under Illinois
law. The district court later denied Dow Jones's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent
the CBT's use of the index. Board of Trade v. Dow Jones, 108 111. App. 3d 681, 687 n.1,
439 N.E.2d 526, 530 n.1 (1982).
29. 108 111. App. 3d at 689, 439 N.E.2d at 532. Use of a Dow Jones index as a trading
vehicle could not have been a part of the bargain between the two parties because the stock
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the CBT Index was identical to the Dow Jones Averages,30 the court de-
cided that Dow Jones's name and averages carried a substantial commercial
value." The appeals panel held that the CBT's use of the index amounted
to misappropriation of Dow Jones's intellectual property, even though the
two firms were not competing in the same marketplace.32
In its appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the CBT contended that the
appellate court's decision erroneously expanded the common law tort of
misappropriation in Illinois by eliminating proof of competitive injury,
formerly an essential element of a successful claim.33 The CBT further con-
tended that it had done nothing wrong in merely creating a new product.
Dow Jones, the CBT asserted, would enjoy a monopoly on its product if
the court disallowed CBT's use of the index.3 Dow Jones countered that
the tort of misappropriation should be flexible enough to prevent enterprise
piracy. Furthermore, preventing the CBT from exploiting Dow Jones's good
will, even though the parties were not direct competitors, would maintain
an incentive for creating, rather than appropriating, intellectual property.
Dow Jones pointed out that it merely sought to protect its property, not
to establish a monopoly."
THE COURT'S DECISION AND ANALYSIS
The Illinois Supreme Court, in a divided decision,3 6 affirmed the appellate
court and held that the CBT could not use the Dow Jones index as the
basis of its stock index futures contract without Dow Jones's permission.37
To do otherwise would be misappropriation, a form of unfair competition
first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in International News
Service v. Associated Press.3" The Dow Jones court recognized that while
producers of intellectual property deserve protection, our free market economy
market index contract had not yet been devised when the contract was signed in 1978. Id.
at 688-89, 439 N.E.2d at 532. The stock market index futures contract, the "newest innovation
in the relatively young field of financial futures trading," only recently has become a commer-
cial possibility. Id. at 689, 439 N.E.2d at 532.
30. Id. at 692, 439 N.E.2d at 534.
31. Id. at 696, 439 N.E.2d at 537.
32. Id. at 697, 439 N.E.2d at 537.
33. 98 Il1. 2d at 116, 456 N.E.2d at 87.
34. Id. at 116-18, 456 N.E.2d at 87-88.
35. Id. at 118, 456 N.E.2d at 88.
36. Justice Goldenhersh wrote the majority's opinion. Justice Simon was joined in his dis-
sent by Justices Ward and Moran.
37. 98 I1. 2d at 109, 456 N.E.2d at 84.
38. 248 U.S. 215 (1918), cited in Dow Jones, 98 Ill. 2d at 118, 456 N.E.2d at 88. Interna-
tional News Service and Associated Press were "in the keenest competition between themselves
in the distribution of news throughout the United States." 248 U.S. at 230. INS was copying
original news items from AP bulletin boards and transmitting them to INS-member newspapers
on the west coast before some AP members received them. Id. at 231. Finding that INS's
conduct constituted unfair competition, the Court stated that
[sitripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized interference with
[Vol. 33:595
19841 BOARD OF TRADE V. DOW JONES & CO.
depends on the freedom to duplicate and imitate.3 9 The amount of protec-
the normal operation of [AP]'s legitimate business precisely at the point where the
profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion of the profit from
those who have earned it to those who have not.
Id. at 240. The Court concluded that the interest in providing an incentive to expend labor
and money to transmit news outweighed the interest in freely disseminating uncopyrighted material
to the masses as part of our free market economy. Id. at 249-50. INS, in attempting to
"appropriat[e] to itself the harvest of those who have sown," thus was unjustly enriched while
injuring AP's competitive position in the news marketplace. Id.
An unfair competition claim had previously required proof that a party had been injured
by a direct competitor, see supra note 1, who had "passed off" the first party's product as
its own. INS, rather than misrepresenting AP's product as its own, had "substitute[d] misap-
propriation in the place of misrepresentation, and. [sold] complainant's goods as its own." 248
U.S. at 249-50. The INS decision thus discarded the "passing off" requirement, replacing it
with unjust enrichment. See Waxman, Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 52 TEX. L.
REV. 42, 59 (1973) (favoring INS's recognition of AP's quasi property right in news stories
that retain commercial value).
After the INS Court had eradicated the "passing off" requirement of an unfair competition
claim, the new misappropriation doctrine received a mixed reception among the lower courts.
See P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHTS, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 115 (2d
ed. 1981) (although widely criticized elsewhere, INS has "enjoyed a broad and continuing
acceptance in New York"); Competitive Torts, supra note 2, at 935-36 (detailing that few jurisdic-
tions have wholeheartedly embraced the INS doctrine, while many accept it only grudgingly).
Nevertheless, the INS decision has been recognized generally as broadening the bounds of
the tort of unfair competition to encourage ethical business conduct. See Intermountain Broad-
casting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 322 (D. Idaho 1961)
(Idaho has adopted the broadened view of unfair competition espoused in INS); CBS v. Melody
Recordings, 134 N.J. Super. 368, 375, 341 A.2d 348, 352 (1975) (common law, through expan-
sive view of unfair competition, has established more scrupulous standards of business fairness);
Waring v. WDAS Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 452, 194 A. 631, 640 (1937) (elimination of "passing
off" requirement allows equity courts to grant more protection). Judge Learned Hand, however,
refused to enjoin a radio company from broadcasting certain records, stating that INS should
be limited to its facts. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940); see also
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (state unfair competition laws
protecting unpatented items from imitation run counter to principles behind the federal patent
laws and Supremacy Clause); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (same
holding as Compco). Application of the Sears and Compco decisions has been very restricted.
See 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1, at § 15.07 (despite Sears and Compco decisions, INS mis-
appropriation doctrine remains intact); P. GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 137 (identifying trend to
"distinguish, dismiss or simply ignore the two decisions"); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1973) (states may protect intellectual property that forms trade secrets,
as long as state regulations do not conflict with federal laws governing patents and copyrights);
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570-71 (1973) (upholding state copyright law to control
record and tape piracy); Mercury Record Prod. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d
163, 178, 218 N.W.2d 705, 712 (1974) (copyright protection can be granted through both com-
mon law and state statute).
In addition to the INS case, the Dow Jones court cited Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130
I11. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970). Spies was the first Illinois case recognizing the tort
of misappropriation. 98 I11. 2d at 118, 456 N.E.2d at 88. In Spies, the defendant purchased
the plaintiff's records and tapes, copied them, and sold the re-recorded tapes. 130 111. App.
2d at 430-31, 264 N.E.2d at 875. Thus, the defendant was able to compete directly with the
plaintiff at a much lower cost. The court concluded that the defendant's unfair appropriation
of the plaintiff's goods was tortious. Id. at 434-35, 264 N.E.2d at 877.
39. 98 111. 2d at 119, 456 N.E.2d at 89. The court cited Justice Brandeis's dissent in INS,
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tion required by a producer of intellectual property and the degree of freedom
needed by a would-be innovator are dependent on the particular type of
business involved."0 The court reasoned that if, for example, the producer
anticipated renumeration for the use of its product, and if others in that
business community expected to pay for the use, the balance of interests
tipped in favor of protection for the producer."
In this case, the CBT offered to pay Dow Jones a per-transaction fee
that could have amounted to between one and two million dollars per year.
This offer, said the court, acknowledged that Dow Jones had a proprietary
interest in its name and averages that was worthy of protection. The court
noted that a decision adverse to Dow Jones would not greatly affect its
revenues.' 2 A decision in favor of Dow Jones, however, would not preclude
the CBT from entering the stock index futures contract market with a dif-
ferent index.' 3 Furthermore, such a decision would encourage the creation
of new indices especially designed to counteract the systematic risk involved
in stock market investment." This economic encouragement, the court con-
cluded, outweighed any negative effect that might result from prohibiting
recognizing society's interest in allowing imitation in the marketplace. Id. (citing INS, 248 U.S.
at 259 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). For the proposition that freedom to imitate should prevail
over the protection policy, see also Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 122
(1938) (allowing competitor to use "shredded wheat," a formerly patented product, as a partial
designation for its product); Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave,
Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 326 (D. Idaho 1961) (allowing a microwave company to transmit to
its customers television programs which were exclusively licensed to another company); Rahl,
The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 Osno ST. L.J. 56, 72 (1962) ("Imitation is inherent
in any system of competition and it is imperative for an economy in which there is rapid
technological advance.").
40. 98 Ill. 2d at 120, 456 N.E.2d at 89.
41. Id. In weighing the interests, the court avoided an analytical detour followed by a few
of the other courts that have considered misappropriation claims. It did not attempt to stratify
the marketplace to determine if both companies could concurrently use the indices without
conflict. One court that did stratify the marketplace found that the two parties operated "in
different ways for different .reasons," so that the competitor did not threaten the "primary
purpose" of the originator. Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave,
Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 325 (D. Idaho 1961); see also NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp.
1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) (state lottery based on NFL games scores was "collateral" to profes-
sional football performances and thus did not constitute misappropriation).
42. 98 I11. 2d at 120, 456 N.E.2d at 89. The prospect, however, that Dow Jones would
lose the ability to license the index in the future, when it had originally not contemplated such
a marketing move, does not create a protectible property right. The court stated that such
an argument is "circular." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. According to the testimony of a stock market expert, the "overriding purpose [of
a stock index futures contract] is the management of risk." Id. at 112, 456 N.E.2d at 85-86.
The non-systematic risk, that an individual company may have problems, may be countered
by a diversified portfolio. Diversification, however, will not protect the investor from systematic
risk, which is that "associated with the broad general movements of the stock market as a
whole." Id. To deal with systematic risk, the investor must either sell stocks, a strategy that
is undesireable for several reasons, or invest in a stock index futures contract that predicts
a market decline. Id.
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the CBT's proposed use of Dow Jones's intellectual property." Moreover,
such use would result in the CBT's unjust enrichment, although it had neither
diverted profit from Dow Jones nor competed in the same marketplace."
The dissent argued that the majority's decision wrongly expanded intellec-
tual property rights beyond their common law limits by eliminating the plain-
tiff's burden of demonstrating that it suffered a competitive injury.' 7 The
dissent reasoned that Dow Jones could not have suffered a competitive injury
through the CBT's use of the index because it did not sell the same type
of products or services. The dissent noted that, in fact, the majority
acknowledged that the two were not competitors.' 8 If such an expansion
of intellectual property rights were to be made at all, the dissent asserted,
it should be made by the federal or state legislature."9
The dissent further admonished that elimination of the competitive injury
requirement would reduce the incentive to develop permutations on existing
products. 0 Moreover, the majority's concentration on unjust enrichment as
the sole requirement of proof could hinder the pace of innovation, leaving
little information in the public domain." Rather, the dissent argued, the
majority should have emphasized "the unfettered access to ideas in the public
domain, a privilege which is essential to our free market economy. '"52
45. Id. at 121, 456 N.E.2d at 90.
46. Id. Illinois is not the first jurisdiction to do away with the competitive injury require-
ment of the misappropriation doctrine. A very expansive view of the misappropriation principle
was enunciated in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc.
786, 794, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795
(1951), in which the court held that an opera company did not have to prove that it competed
with a recording company in order to succeed on its misappropriation claim. See infra text
accompanying notes 65-68.
47. 98 Il1. 2d at 123-27, 456 N.E.2d at 91-93 (Simon, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed
to the INS Court's analysis that emphasized the competitive relationship between INS and AP
in the news business. See supra note 38. The dissent noted that many courts that discuss misap-
propriation require a showing of competitive injury, and cite as support Standard & Poor's
Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 711 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to allow a com-
peting commodities exchange to base its stock market index on the Standard & Poor's 500);
NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Del. 1977) (allowing a state lottery
to use NFL game scores because parties were not in same business); and Metropolitan Opera
Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 795, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 491 (1950)
(denying record company the right to record oper.a performances from radio broadcasts), aff'd
per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951).
48. 98 Ill. 2d at 127, 456 N.E.2d at 92 (Simon, J., dissenting). Dow Jones, the dissent
observed, had merely an "inchoate interest" in the CBT's use of the index as the basis for
the futures contract. In contrast, the CBT's plan to use the Dow Jones Averages amounted
merely to an innovative step in using information that the public had been freely allowed to
acquire. Because the CBT's profits from the enterprise would not be at the expense of Dow
Jones, the dissent concluded that the majority's finding of "unjust enrichment" should not
be sufficient to sustain the misappropriation claim. Id. at 127, 456 N.E.2d at 93 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
49. Id. at 124, 456 N.E.2d at 91 (Simon, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 123, 456 N.E.2d at 91 (Simon, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 127, 456 N.E.2d at 93 (Simon, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 123, 456 N.E.2d at 91 (Simon, J., dissenting). The dissent apparently would pro-
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE DECISION
By eliminating the competitive injury requirement, the Dow Jones deci-
sion has expanded the protection of intellectual property rights in Illinois.
The case presents a flexible approach to the adjudication of misappropria-
tion cases that reflects current business realities. The Illinois court, however,
did not provide sufficient guidelines for the application of its new misap-
propriation test.
This new test is a departure from traditional misappropriation law,
especially in its support for the originators of intellectual property. Tradi-
tionally, some courts have defined the concept of competitive injury narrowly,
making it very difficult for misappropriation plaintiffs to prevail." For
example, in NFL v. Governor of Delaware,54 the court found that a state's
use of the final scores from NFL football games in a lottery was a "collateral
service"" that was merely incidental to the league's performance. The NFL
court held that, although the state was clearly profiting from the popularity
of the NFL games, one business could not be foreclosed from profiting on
a service that is only collateral to another's successful venture. 6
An even narrower construction of competitive injury worked against the
plaintiff in Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho
Microwave, Inc." The Intermountain court determined that the plaintiff
broadcasting company's primary source of profit was in the sales of com-
mercials on its television programs, while the defendant microwave company's
profit derived from transmitting television signals to home subscribers." The
court concluded that, because the two companies did not operate for the
same primary purpose, the defendant had not misappropriated the latter's
property in transmitting the plaintiff's programs to the defendant's
tect any novel or innovative use that an imitator devised. This approach parallels the "fair
use" exception to the copyright body of law. Although the dissent purported to promote the
widest dissemnation of ideas and intellectual property in a free market economy, id. at 124,
456 N.E.2d at 91 (Simon, J., dissenting), it overlooked the obvious result of an adverse deci-
sion for Dow Jones: less development of new stock market indices. The CBT, if allowed to
appropriate the well-known and recognized indices produced by Dow Jones, certainly would
not be stimulated to devise an index of its own. Thus, the dissent's conclusion is inapposite
to the result it prefers to achieve. But see Baird, supra note 2, at 413 (questioning whether
misappropriation analysis should be analogous to that of copyright infringement cases that
recognize some copying as "fair use" of product).
53. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
54. 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977).
55. The NFL court defined collateral services as those that are merely a by-product of another
firm's operation. The NFL court likened the state's lottery to other collateral services that
extend from NFL games, such as charter bus companies that make money from transporting
fans to the games and concessionaries who sell programs and popcorn on the sidewalks leading
to football stadiums. Id. at 1378.
56. Id. The NFL court, emphasizing that "we live in an age of economic and social
interdependence," found that many business operations benefit, to some degree, from the labor
of others. Id.
57. 196 F. Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961).
58. Id. at 325.
[Vol. 33:595
19841 BOARD OF TRADE V. DOW JONES & CO.
subscribers.5 9 These cases illustrate the willingness of courts to construct
models of the marketplace that obviate a finding of competitive injury and,
in turn, misappropriation.
The Dow Jones court eliminated competitive injury from its analysis and
instead stressed a balancing approach. This approach removed the inflex-
ibility from the Illinois misappropriation doctrine. Rather than treating the
type of competition between the parties as determinative, the court focused
on the unjust enrichment that would have resulted to the CBT if it were
allowed to use the Dow Jones index with impunity.6 This focus emphasized
the broader principle underlying the misappropriation doctrine: that property
of commercial value should be protected from another's unauthorized use
for profit. 6'
The Dow Jones decision is consistent with the recognition that the mis-
appropriation doctrine cannot be reduced to general, all-purpose rules."2 Like
Dow Jones, other courts also have based their analyses on the unjust enrich-
ment element.6 3 The Dow Jones decision correctly recognized that the misap-
propriation doctrine must be flexible enough to provide courts a panoply
of resources to facilitate the eradication of enterprise piracy from the
marketplace. 64
59. Id. at 326. The intermountain court interpreted the INS decision to require interference
with the primary purpose of the originator's business to support a finding of misappropriation.
Id. at 325-26. One commentator, noting that the Intermountain plaintiff had not demonstrated
a "need for protection against frustration of the primary marketing purpose," urged that an
emphasis on the primary marketing purpose of a firm affords ample protection to the trade
values with little reduction in competition. See Rahl, supra note 39, at 62-63.
60. 98 I11. 2d at 120-22, 456 N.E.2d at 89-90.
61. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 794,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 492 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); see
also infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing New York's rejection of the com-
petitive injury requirement and focus on protection of property). A prominent commentator
on the tort of misappropriation asserts that the doctrine "protects the viability of a business
system . . . from attack by anyone, competitor or otherwise, who would undermine its struc-
ture or operation at some point of particular vulnerability." 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1,
at § 15.08.
62. See Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 792,
101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (1950) (recognizing critical importance of facts in misappropriation claim),
aff'd per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951); P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 38, at
115 ("question of misappropriation is one of degree"); Sell, supra note 3, at 496 (misappropriation
doctrine is "elastic concept workable in an area of changing circumstances"); Competitive Torts,
supra note 2, at 937 (noting that the balance of interests in misappropriation cases varies with
facts of each case and type of intangible property).
63. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (essence
of misappropriation is profit from another's expense of energy); Standard & Poor's Corp. v.
Commodity Exch., Inc. 683 F.2d 704, 711 (1982) (misappropriation is broad tort encompassing
attempts to gain through efforts of another); Mercury Record Prod. v. Economic Consultants,
Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 175, 218 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1974) (defendant "endeavoring to reap where
it has not sown"); see also Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409,
1412 (1974) (discussing how the imitator enjoys a free ride from the originator's success, which
amounts to unjust enrichment).
64. A flexible doctrine allows courts to apply equitable remedies for an apparent wrong
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
Although few jurisdictions have gone as far as the Dow Jones court in
reforming the misappropriation doctrine, the case is not a complete maverick.
New York, for example, discarded the competitive injury requirement over
thirty years ago in Metropolitan Opera Association v. Wagner-Nichols
Recorder Corp.6" The Metropolitan Opera court held that an opera com-
pany did not have to prove that it competed with a recording company to
succeed in its misappropriation claim. In rejecting the defendant's assertion
that actual competition between the two parties must be demonstrated to
support a misappropriation claim, the court focused on modern business
operations. With the increasing complexity of business relationships, the court
noted, companies operating in "theoretically non-competitive fields" can
inflict severe injury upon each other to the same extent as if they were direct
competitors." Like the Dow Jones court, the Metropolitan Opera court found
that the success of an unfair competition claim need not rest on an allega-
tion of direct competitive injury. Instead, the Metropolitan Opera court deter-
mined that the tort should rest on the broader principle of protecting com-
mercially valuable property rights from all forms of commercial immorality,
unfair invasion, or infringement."7 Accordingly, the court deemed that the
defendant's recording of opera broadcasts was a misappropriation of the
plaintiff's performances."
Dow Jones is also consistent with a recent Second Circuit opinion, Standard
& Poor's Corp. v. Commodities Exchange, Inc.69 The facts of Standard are
similar to those found in Dow Jones. Standard & Poor's had entered into
an exclusive rights agreement allowing the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to
use the S&P 500 Index as the underlying commodity of a stock index futures
contract. 0 Defendant Commodities Exchange also tried to trade a stock index
futures contract based on the S&P 500 Index that would have been called
the Comex 500 Index.7" Plaintiff Standard & Poor's successfully sued to
enjoin the defendant from trading a contract based on the Standard & Poor's
where the legislature has failed to provide protection. Mercury Record Prod. v. Economic Con-
sultants, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 163, 186, 218 N.W.2d 705, 715 (1974). At the same time, there
is no indication that an expansive view of misappropriation has not been used by courts "as
a license to cut rough justice wherever they find competitive practices they do not like." Baird,
supra note 2, at 422.
65. 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d
795 (1951).
66. Id. at 794, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
67. Id. The court stated that "a court of equity will penetrate and restrain every guise
resorted to by the perpetrator" in protecting property rights of commercial value. Id.
68. Id. Few other courts have risen to the Metropolitan Opera court's challenge to protect
businesses from all forms of commercial misconduct. One commentator, without specifically
classifying the case as an aberration, pointed out prior to the Dow Jones decision that New
York was the only state to afford the misappropriation doctrine so expansive a reading. See
Competitive Torts, supra note 2, at 935.
69. 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 706.
71. Id. at 707.
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name or index. In affirming the district court's decision to grant an
injunction, 72 the circuit court found that the index was a salable product
and that the plaintiff had a significant interest in the stock index futures
contract business due to its agreement with the Mercantile Exchange. The
court concluded that the parties thus were essentially competitors, and
therefore, that the plaintiff's misappropriation claim had merit. 3 The Dow
Jones court went a crucial step further in protecting the Dow Jones name
and index in the absence of a competing licensing agreement between Dow
Jones and a third party. Nevertheless, the cases are similar in their protec-
tion of the intellectual property rights of a stock index compiler.
In formulating its approach to misappropriation claims, the Dow Jones
court acknowledged the significance of the particular business setting under-
lying the unfair competition claim." In tethering its analysis to the type of
business, the court accurately discerned that the misappropriation doctrine
is intended to reflect the prevailing ethics and economic needs of a society
in which conduct considered unfair by one sector of the business community
"may be regarded as eminently proper by another."" Misappropriation, a
business tort, is thus inextricably entwined to the continually changing social
and economic climate. 76 The innovative stock index futures contracts central
to the Dow Jones dispute sparked fierce competition to secure rights to well-
known and recognized stock indices. Had the Dow Jones court approved
the CBT's use of the stock market index, the CBT presumably would have
had a "free ride" while other commodities exchanges paid for comparable
indices through licensing agreements. 7 The Dow Jones decision appears to
be predicated on the court's assumption of its ethical and economic impact.
Although the decision neither negatively affects existing exclusive rights
agreements nor precludes Dow Jones from entering this lucrative area in
the future, the decision keeps the CBT from taking unfair advantage of a
non-competitor. The result is a doctrine responsive to the realities of a rapidly-
changing business world.
72. Id. at 712.
73. Id. at 710-11.
74. 98 I11. 2d at 120, 456 N.E.2d at 89.
75. Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REV. 175, 175 (1936). Thus, misappropria-
tion may be seen as a symbol of "the law's capacity for growth in response to the ethical,
as well as the economic needs of society." Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 430, 155 N.Y.S.2d
443, 451 (1956), quoted in Comment, Misappropriation Doctrine, supra note 2, at 479.
76. Many misappropriation cases "can be reconciled in terms of the economic and social
impact of providing or denying protection, and it seems difficult to devise a more satisfactory
concept for deciding the future cases." Competitive Torts, supra note 2, at 937.
77. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; see also Roy Export Co. Establishment
of Vaduz v. CBS, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.) (exclusive right to use film clips featuring Charlie
Chaplin), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60 (1982); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder
Corp., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950) (agreement to broadcast opera performance
exclusively on a certain radio station), aff'd per curiam, 279 A.D. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951);
Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co., 255 A.D. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1938)
(defendant's acts exceeded the rights granted in an agreement to take photos at a large sports
auditorium).
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The Dow Jones court's move toward a more flexible misappropriation
analysis is laudable, although it unfortunately sets forth few guidelines for
the resolution of future misappropriation claims." The most troublesome
question left unanswered by the Dow Jones opinion is how the injury and
damages of a misappropriation plaintiff are to be assessed. Such a plaintiff
usually must prove that the market for its product would be substantially
destroyed by the defendant's actions, or at least that its business purpose
would be frustrated. 9 In contrast, by admitting that Dow Jones would not
have suffered pecuniary injury by the CBT's use of its index,"0 the majority
implies that a misappropriation plaintiff need not prove any injury to itself
as long as the defendant is unjustly enriched."
Moreover, if any injury requirement survives Dow Jones, it will be dif-
ficult to measure the injury in the non-competitive context. A direct com-
petitor can show lost profits, and a non-competitor who has a licensing agree-
ment with a competitor of the defendant can show the value of the property
involved." A plaintiff in Dow Jones's position, however, cannot assert
successfully that it suffered the loss of prospective licensing fees. Even the
majority referred to such an assertion as "circular."' 3
On the other hand, in protecting Dow Jones's option to enter the stock
index futures contract market at a future date, the court recognized the
economic reality that competition is a dynamic process whereby forces within
the marketplace spawn new products and diversification for competitors."'
By refusing to allow the parties' relationship in the marketplace to dictate
the outcome of the claim, the court acknowledged that business relation-
ships are not constant; companies that have no relationship today may become
competitors tomorrow.
Because the case was brought merely for a declaratory judgment, the court's
lack of guidelines regarding injuries and damages is understandable.' Less
78. Justice Simon voiced his "fear that the majority opinion offers little guidance to the
courts and bar of Illinois on how to apply this greatly expanded tort in other circumstances."
98 Ill. 2d at 124, 456 N.E.2d at 91 (Simon, J., dissenting).
79. Rahl, supra note 39, at 62.
80. 98 111. 2d at 119-20, 456 N.E.2d at 89.
81. Id. at 121, 456 N.E.2d at 72. Not only was the dissent troubled by the majority's ap-
parent reduction of the tort of misappropriation to the single element of unjust enrichment,
but it disagreed that CBT's enrichment was, in fact, unjust. Id. at 127, 456 N.E.2d at 93
(Simon, J., dissenting).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73 (discussion of Standard & Poor's Corp. v.
Commodities Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982)).
83. 98 II1. 2d at 120, 456 N.E.2d at 89.
84. A company's past should not dictate its future because competition forces a "sequence
of moves and responses" by participants in the marketplace. As one economist explained:
[l~n the field of industry and trade, competition as an activity . . . may be viewed
as a series of initiatory moves and defensive responses; and much of the explana-
tion of the basic competitive paradox in this field resides in this sequence, and
is to be explained in terms of the character and of the moves, the character and
timing of the responses, and the uncertainties of their timing and their efficacy.
J. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 471 (1961).
85. Plaintiff CBT, which would have been in the position of defendant in a misappropria-
[Vol. 33:595
19841 BOARD OF TRADE V. DOW JONES & CO.
understandable, however, is its failure to address directly the questionable
commercial morality of the CBT's conduct.", Such an inquiry, often made
by other courts,8 7 would seem to follow from the basic tenet of the misap-
propriation doctrine which stresses the preservation and promotion of ethical
competition. 8 In applying its balancing test, the Dow Jones court seemed
more concerned with economic productivity than business ethics. The deci-
sion thus may have the effect of lessening the standards of ethical business
conduct in the adjudication of misappropriation claims.
IMPACT
The Dow Jones court's elimination of the competitive injury requirement
extends protection of intellectual property rights to producers of intellectual
property who have refused to enter an exclusive rights agreement for use
of the property or have declined a path of diversification. The decision
bolsters the strong public policy first enunciated in INS against rewarding
those who reap where they have not sown.' 9 When a court determines that
the property in dispute has commercial value, it may prohibit unauthorized
use by any imitator, regardless of the effect, if any, on the originator's
business. Thus, this decision makes it more difficult for a non-competitor
to use another's intellectual property in a novel way when other products
could be developed independently.
This restriction on innovation by imitation, as predicted by the court,"0
may result in encouraging the development of new stock indices tailor-made
for futures contract trading. Unfortunately, these new indices could not be
used as the bases of stock index futures contracts under current CFTC
policy." If this policy were to change, however, the introduction of the newly-
designed indices most likely would result in greater protection for stock index
futures contract investors. By thus lowering the systematic risk involved in
tion case, had filed a suit for declaratory judgment. 98 II. 2d at 110-11, 456 N.E.2d at 85.
86. It is apparent from Dow Jones's adamant refusal to consider licensing requests from
three other commodities exchanges that it did not want to become involved in the stock index
futures contracts business. Yet, after Dow Jones refused to allow the CBT to use its index,
the CBT placed itself in the ignominious position of adopting the Dow Jones Industrial Average
in its application to the CFTC. Id. at 114, 456 N.E.2d at 86.
87. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 709 (2d
Cir. 1982) (finding that the commodities exchange's conduct inferred bad faith when it attempted
to adopt a stock market index as the basis of its futures contract after the plaintiff had denied
it a licensing agreement to do so); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, 672 F.2d
1095, 1106 (2d Cir.) (finding plaintiff's misappropriation claim supported by defendant's lack
of good faith in broadcasting program to which another party held exclusive right), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 60 (1982); CBS v. Melody Recordings, 134 N.J. Super. 368, 375, 341 A.2d 348,
352 (1975) (courts should apply more scrupulous standards of business fairness and commercial
morality in trade).
88. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (decided on theory
of maintaining ethical standards in competition); 2 R. CALLMANN, supra note 1, at § 4.63.
89. 248 U.S. at 239-40.
90. 98 11. 2d at 120, 456 N.E.2d at 89.
91. See supra note 19.
610 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:595
stock trading, the ultimate effect would be an overall stimulation of the
economy by making investment in the stock market safer and more attractive.
CONCLUSION
In expanding intellectual property rights, the Dow Jones court eliminated
the competitive injury element that was formerly required in a misappropria-
tion claim. The decision will make misappropriation litigation more respon-
sive to the problems that arise in a fast-paced business setting. Nevertheless,
it leaves questions unanswered. The opinion did not provide guidelines on
how a plaintiff's injuries or damages should be assessed in misappropriation
cases arising between most non-competitors. The court also failed to address
what impact, if any, the imitator's conduct should have on the court's deci-
sion.
Despite its lack of guidelines, the Dow Jones decision extended deserved
protection from enterprise piracy to producers of the popular stock indices.
A ruling in favor of the CBT would have undercut the strong public interest
in promoting fair business practices and honesty in commercial dealings. 2
The Dow Jones court's analysis will be used by other Illinois courts to find
misappropriation as long as protection of the originator's property would
have a beneficial effect on the economy. Moreover, the decision illustrates
how a common law doctrine can be modified to respond to innovative forces
in the marketplace. The Dow Jones decision expands intellectual property
rights to meet the demands of a changing business setting, and thus
underscores the need for fairness in commercial dealings.
Carol McHugh
92. It has been asserted that a healthy free market economy depends on fairness in business.
"Free competition cannot exist in the climate of unfair or commercially immoral conduct by
one competitor against another. Such conduct destroys rather than promotes competition and
can itself create a monopoly. Free competition impels honest, fair conduct by the parties."
Sell, supra note 3, at 497.
